课堂小组报告

最后两节课会用于小组报告. 每次课程结束后, 会投票选出当天整体表现最好的小组.

基本要求如下:

• 报告时长: 6 分钟.
• 每位组员都必须上台参与报告.

小组报告选题:

• 任何和信息经济学相关的题目都可以. 下面提供的这些阅读资料仅供参考.

阅读资料

拍卖/机制设计理论:

• National Academy of Sciences Report “The Bidding Game,” March 2003. PDF

• Klemperer, Paul, “What Really Matters in Auction Design,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2002. PDF

  • 本文相对通俗易懂, 主要讨论的是大规模拍卖设计中的经济问题

拍卖理论的应用:

• Hendricks, Ken, and Robert Porter, “An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information,” American Economic Review, 1988. PDF
  • 关于石油租赁竞标中”赢家诅咒”的经典研究
• Richard Thaler, “Anomalies: The Winner’s Curse,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2(1), Winter 1988, 191-202. PDF
  • 本文相对通俗易懂, 主要讨论赢家诅咒的实验和经验证据

搜索广告拍卖 (Sponsored Search Auctions)

• Hal Varian, “The Economics of Internet Search,” Angelo Costa Lecture, 2007. PDF

• Ben Edelman, Michael Ostrovsky and Michael Schwarz, “Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction,” American Economic Review, 2007.

  • 本文系统分析了谷歌的搜索广告拍卖机制, 阅读难度相对较高. PDF

多商品分配与匹配市场

• 限于课时, 课堂未涉及匹配理论专题. 匹配市场可能是机制设计(或市场设计)领域最具现实影响力的研究方向.

• David Gale and Lloyd Shapley, “College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage,” American Mathematical Monthly, 69, 1962, pp. 9-15. PDF

  • 延迟接受算法的开山之作. 作者在论文最后的陈述很有意思:
    “[…], we recommend the statement and proof of our Theorem 1. The argument is carried out not in mathematical symbols but in ordinary English; there are no obscure or technical terms. Knowledge of calculus is not presupposed. In fact, one hardly needs to know how to count. Yet any mathematician will immediately recognize the argument as mathematical, while people without mathematical training will probably find difficulty in following the argument, though not because of unfamiliarity with the subject matter.”

通俗读物

• Who Gets What — and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design. PDF
• 合适: 从升学择校、相亲配对、牌照拍卖了解新兴实用经济学. 中文 PDF